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Pursuant to URAP 35, William Lowe and Augusta Rose petition for 
rehearing. Their counsel, Robert Henry Copier, certifies that this petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. This petition seeks to have the 
award of attorney fees for failure to meet appellate briefing requirements 
removed from this court's Opinion of December 6, 2007, in that the court 
misapprehended the success of appellants in meeting all their objectives on 
appeal, misapprehended the briefing strategy successfully employed by 
appellants in successfully securing those objectives, misapprehended the 
briefing tactics employed by appellants in successfully pursuing that strategy, 
and granted attorney fees in error even though appellee's request for fees 
included neither applicable citations nor a properly developed argument. 
I. Implicit in the award of attorney fees is the assumption by this 
court that Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose failed to meet their objectives on 
appeal. This is a misapprehension. Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose had two 
objectives. The first was to secure a holding from this appellate court that 
the April 26, 2005, trial court ruling and order that favorably disposed of the 
contempt claims against them was a final, appealable order that Ms. Ninow 
did not appeal within 30 days. By securing such a holding, Mr. Lowe and 
Ms. Rose assert that the res judicata thereby in place should put a stop to 
serial contempt motions Ms. Ninow has attempted to pursue against them. 
The second objective was to secure a holding that their removal as 
officers and directors on August 16, 2005, was substantively identical to the 
finding of fact made in 2003 that they had been removed in 2002 and that 
the order made in August 16, 2005, was effective nunc pro tunc to the earlier 
date of removal. By securing that objective, they have solidified their status 
as both officers and a quorum of directors of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, 
Inc., from the death of Gary Pahl in June of 2000 through mid-May of 2002. 
It was proper to get such a holding, because in her initial TRO moving 
papers in May of 2002, Ms Ninow had claimed that Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose 
had never been officers or directors. As this would have required a jury trial 
of facts as to which Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose were the only living witnesses, 
Ms. Ninow backed off from this when moving for the summary judgment in 
2002 and, instead, obtained a factual finding that they had been removed by 
unanimous shareholder action in mid-May of 2002. Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose 
can live with that, since it means they were officers and directors until then. 
The December 6, 2007, holding now solidifies that status even more. 
II. Implicit in the award of attorney fees is the assumption by this 
court that Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose either had no appellate briefing 
strategy or that their strategy failed. This is a misapprehension. The 
strategy employed by Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose on appeal was to leave as 
little to chance as possible by coaxing their adversary, Ms. Ninow, to argue 
on appeal that the April 26, 2005, trial court ruling and order that favorably 
disposed of the contempt claims against them was a final, appealable order, 
and that their removal as officers and directors on August 16, 2005, was 
substantively identical to the finding of fact made in 2003 that they had been 
removed in 2002 and that the order made in August 16, 2005, was effective 
nunc pro tunc to the earlier date of removal. By getting their adversary to 
argue in favor of what they wanted [see Brief of Appellee, LC at p. 21; ILB 
at p. 24], Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose successfully pursued this briefing strategy. 
III. Implicit in the award of attorney fees is the assumption by this 
court that Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose either utilized no appellate briefing 
tactics to support their strategy or that their tactics failed. This is a 
misapprehension. Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose utilized two tactics to pursue 
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their strategy of getting their adversary, Ms. Ninow, to argue in favor of that 
which Mr. Lowe and Ms. litose desired to achieve on appeal. The first of 
these tactics was to raise issues that would make it prudent for Ms. Ninow to 
so argue, since all alternatives were more risky and burdensome. Ms. Ninow 
was faced with such a choice between arguing that the April 26, 2005, trial 
court ruling and order that favorably disposed of the contempt claims against 
Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose was a final and appealable order, or the much more 
risky and burdensome alternative of arguing that the ruling and order should 
be disregarded, which would mean there was no final order until August 16, 
2005, and that this court could reach and restore the November 26, 2002, 
default judgment. In facing that choice, Ms. Ninow declined to choose and 
argued both sides of the question. [See Brief of Appellee, II. A at p. 22; II.B 
at p. 24.] This court decided for her by stating in dicta that the order might 
have been inadvertently entered but holding that it was a final, appealable 
order that had to be appealed within 30 days.1 Ms. Ninow was also faced 
with a choice between arguing that the August 16, 2005, order was effective 
nunc pro tunc to the earlier May 1, 2003, finding [which she attempted to do 
at Brief of Appellee I.C at p. 21] and thereby expose herself to risk that Mr. 
Lowe and Ms. Rose were wrongfully enjoined from May 26, 2005, until 
August 16, 2005, because they had already been removed as officers, or to 
continue to try to argue that they were not wrongfully enjoined by arguing 
1
 There is nothing in the trial court record by which the trial court indicated 
she had signed the April 26, 2005, order inadvertently, Speculation in that 
regardj}y Ms. Ninow in her brief and by this court in dicta is unfair to |he 
trial court in that it calls into question her attentiveness and scholarship. It is 
more likely that she intentionally entered the April 26, 2005, order and then 
forgot about it later when Ms. Ninow kept on filing serial contempt motions. 
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no final order had yet entered. Since this would again have cieated a risk 
that this court would reach and reinstate the November 26, 2002, default 
judgment, it was very prudent for Ms. Nmow to argue that the removal had 
been concluded by final, appelable order m 2003. The second tactic used 
by Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose to subtly channel Ms. Nmow into arguing m 
favor of what Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose wanted involved appellate briefing 
work that is both proprietary and protected by the attorney work product 
privilege It is sufficient to state for these purposes that it involves use by 
the undersigned attorney/CPA of probability analysis and the quantifying of 
prior behavior by opposing counsel to predict how an adversary will respond 
during the litigation process when confronted with specific types of briefing. 
Those experiments were successful and the predictions were accurate 
IV. The court overlooked the fact that the appellee's request for fees 
included neither citations that were on-point nor a properly developed 
argument, and it was therefore error to grant an award of attorney fees. 
Ms. Nmow's argument for attorney fees under URAP 24(k) is only 
three paragraphs long. [See Brief of Appellee, VIII.D, pp. 46-47] She cites 
only one case, State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, Par. 11, 99 P.3rd 820. That case 
is inapplicable here because it is a case where the court disregarded portions 
of a brief, but did not award any fees. Appellate courts routinely decline to 
consider portions of briefs, most often when appellants attempt to challenge 
factual findings without meeting the marshaling requirement. As a case m 
which the court disregarded portions of a brief, but did not award fees, State 
v. Green, Id., provides no precedent >r guidance as to specific circumstances 
under which a court should hold that a brief is so extraordinarily deficient m 
terms of its briefing quality that an award of attorney fees under URAP 24(k) 
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should be made in lieu of or in addition to simply disregarding all or part of 
the brief. That case stands only for the proposition that a court may award 
fees under URAP 24(k), a settled legal principle apparent from the rule itself. 
Ms. Ninow then failed to properly develop an argument. She failed to 
identify any specific pages or paragraphs in the Amended Opening Brief that 
should be disregarded or stricken, and as a result of that, this court's decision 
of December 6, 2007, neither strikes any portion of the brief nor identifies 
any brief sentence or paragraph that the court is disregarding for an alleged 
failure to meet appellate briefing requirements. Ms. Ninow argues at the 
beginning of the second paragraph of her three-paragraph argument that the 
Amended Opening Brief "failed to include a summary of arguments . . ." but 
she makes no citation to the Amended Opening Brief to try to demonstrate 
this assertion. The Amended Opening Brief, in fact, includes "a summary of 
arguments." A "Summary of Arguments" is on page 21 and the "Table of 
Contents" lists the said "Summary of Arguments" as appearing on page 21. 
She then asserts, without references to the brief and without specific 
examples, that the entire opening brief is convoluted, verbose, rambling and 
an incredibly tedious read. Because Ms. Ninow did not favor the reader with 
any specific examples, appellants' counsel reread his brief and found it to be 
neither convoluted, verbose, rambling, nor tedious, and also concluded that 
even a single read-through by Ms. Ninow should have caused her to easily 
conclude that she should respond with a relatively short brief in which she 
argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because the April 26, 2005, order 
was a final, appealable order, that judicial removal of William Lowe and 
Augusta Rose and lifting of the preliminary injunction on August 16, 2005, 
was an unnecessary redundancy that related back nunc pro tunc to the final, 
-5-
appealable order entered on May I, 2003, and that therefore she did not need 
to argue anything further in response. She attempted to argue this, but then 
unnecessarily went on to attack the character of appellants' counsel at great 
length and to argue the matters as to which the court would likely hold that it 
lacked jurisdiction once Ms. Ninow conceded that the April 26, 2005, ruling 
and order was a final, appealable order that neither side had timely appealed. 
Ms. Ninow further fails to properly develop an argument when she 
concedes that the "Oseguera issue" is addressed in appellants' opening brief 
with "traditional legal argument and analysis with support by citations to 
proper legal authority" [Brief of Appellee, p. 47, Par. 1] but then fails to 
show why there should be an award of attorney fees in light of this. As this 
court noted in its Opinion, most of the Amended Opening Brief is devoted to 
this "Oseguera issue" and Ms. Ninow concedes that issue was briefed with 
"traditional legal argument and analysis with support by citations to proper 
legal authority." Indeed, in briefing the "Oseguera issue," almost all of the 
brief is devoted to the third-prong of the analysis to be employed in deciding 
whether it was proper to set aside the November 26, 2002, default judgment 
on June 12, 2003, i.e., whether Ms. Ninow had presented a defense of at 
least ostensible merit. [The first two prongs were also properly briefed, i.e., 
whether the motion to set aside the default judgment needed to be filed by 
the 3 month 60(b) deadline and whether Ms. Ninow had provided plausible 
justification for her failure to timely respond to the initial summons within 
20 days and her failure to timely move for relief from judgment within the 
30 month 60(b) deadline.] In briefing that third prong, appellants went 
beyond simply showing that the sole defense that had been raised by Ms. 
Ninow had no ostensible merit under the law of the case [because, when 
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faced squarely with that issue, Judge Medley ruled against Ms. Nmow and 
dismissed the shareholder derivative actions without prejudice instead of 
with prejudice]. In going beyond simply showing that the sole defense that 
she had raised had no ostensible ment under the law of the case, appellants 
broadly surveyed the history of this case to demonstrate the absence of any 
other defenses of at least ostensible ment. Since the burden was on Ms. 
Nmow to show that she had a defense of at least ostensible ment [and not on 
appellants to show that she lacked one], this demonstration in the brief of the 
absence of any other defenses of at least ostensible merit was broad but not 
deep Appellants were not required to serve aces. Instead, they were only 
required to lob the ball onto Ms. Nmow's side of the court and give her the 
choice of either trying to return it, or, as she did, declare the game over [by 
conceding that the April 26, 2005, ruling and order was final and appealable]. 
The Amended Opening Bnef was written under the real possibility 
that this court would hold that neither the April 26, 2005, order nor the 
August 16, 2005, order were final orders, a question still open at the oral 
argument that was raised by the court at the oral argument. It was written to 
send a message to Ms. Nmow that if she did not concede that the April 26, 
2005, order was a final, appealable order, that this court might dismiss this 
appeal as premature for absence of a final, appealable order. At that point, 
Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose would likely have taken a URCP 54(b) run at 
getting the November 26, 2002, default judgment reinstated by Judge 
Kennedy, based on their "traditional legal argument and analysis with 
support by citations to proper legal authority" and the lack ofany ostensible 
defense on the merits. In order to avoid that possibility, it was prudent for 
Ms. Nmow to take the position that the April 26, 2005, ruling and order was 
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final and appealable, which is what appellants wanted her to do in order to--
put an end to Ms. Ninow's pursuit of them, since, Ms. Ninow was still trying 
to keep the dispute going by trying to still keep appellants under injunction. 
The basic point of disagreement between the parties in July of 2005 
was Ms. Ninow's assertion that Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose should be kept 
under injunction because they had been removed as officers and directors 
and the position taken by Ms. Rose that the said matter should be dismissed 
because their removal as officers and directors was an adequate remedy at 
law and that any injunction thereafter was wrongful. The court sided with 
Ms. Rose when she again dismissed on August 16, 2005. The Amended 
Opening Brief was written to give real incentive to KaLynn Ninow to keep 
things that way and to not try to keep this legal dispute going in perpetuity. 
The brief thus achieved its purpose of getting Ms. Ninow to choose to 
end this dispute by conceding that the April 26, 2005, order was final and 
appealable so she could avoid risking a ruling that neither the April 26, 2005, 
order nor the August 16, 2005, were final and leaving appellants free to take 
a 54(b) shot at getting the November 26, 2002, judgment reinstated by Judge 
Kennedy. This purpose might not have been achieved if appellants had not 
broadly written about all of the case factors vitiating any defense of at least 
ostensible merits vis-a-vis the November 26, 2002, default judgment. Since 
appellants achieved all the goals they were pursuing in writing their brief the 
way they did, arguing that they did not meet appellate briefing requirements 
is akin to WWII-era French generals arguing that the Germans could never 
have breached the Maginot Line even though the Panzers were already in 
Paris, having done an end-run through the Low Countries. In like manner, 
the brief at issue was written for a specific purpose that was fully achieved. 
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Had the Amended Opening Brief not been written the way it was, Ms. 
Ninow would likely have perceived no downside in attempting to keep this 
dispute going in the trial court by arguing that the April 26, 2005, order was 
an inadvertent order that should be treated as nullity and that the August 16, 
2005, order was not a final, appealable order because it expressly reserved 
some claims as to some parties for future litigation. Because the brief as 
written demonstrated that trying to keep the dispute going could lead to 
having Judge Kennedy3 take a look under URCP 54(b) at reinstating the 
2
 See, inter alia, the July, 2005, dispute over the injunction as framed in the 
papers appended to the Amended Opening Brief. At R.3081 Ms. Ninow 
argues on July 8, 2005, that only the contempt proceeding remains and that 
as part of that "there is no need to have the preliminary injunction lifted as 
the record in this case clearly shows that Respondents have been removed as 
officers and directors of the Loan Office and that they have no authority to 
act on behalf of the Loan Office." In reply, Augusta Rose argues on July 15, 
2005, at R. 3094 that "the record in this case shows that respondents have 
been removed as officers and directors of the Loan Office and that they have 
no authority to act on behalf of the Loan Office. Because removal of 
respondents as officers and directors constitutes an adequate remedy at law, 
there is no basis to keep them under preliminary injunction in the face of 
said legal remedy.5' The trial court agreed with Ms. Rose, and dismissed on 
August 16, 2005, with express reference to Ms. Ninow's July 8, 2005, filing. 
3Judge Kennedy took over for Judge Lewis. Judge Lewis regularly had her 
openly disseminated judicial evaluation scores dragged down by low marks 
for her appearance of bias. The undersigned believes that for a number of 
years he basked in the warm glow of bias in his favor by Judge Lewis as he 
watched his perplexed and exasperated adversaries in her courtroom trying 
to make sense of why they were losing. When he perceived that the winds 
of bias had inexplicably shifted against him, the undersigned moved to have 
Judge Lewis removed from all of his cases including this probate, two white 
collar criminal defense cases, and another probate. She was removed from 
this probate and the two white collar criminal cases and was then defeated in 
a retention election before the motion in the other probate was ever acted on. 
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November 26, 2002, default judgment due to a lack of a defense of at least 
ostensible merit and the inapplicability of Qseguera to this case, she chose 
the most prudent path by conceding that the April 26, 2005, order was final. 
SinceMs. Ninow concedes that the "Qseguera argument" was briefed 
with "traditional legal argument and analysis with support by citations to 
proper legal authority" and since almost the entire brief is devoted to the 
showing of an absence of lack of defense of at least ostensible merit under 
that analysis, it was error for the Court of Appeals to award attorney fees. 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
While URAP 24(k) provides no express right to hearing upon request 
comparable to the one provided for at in URAP 33(c)(3), this court should 
either remove the award of attorney fees from its Opinion or should grant a 
hearing to the appellants. Because Ms. Ninow did not properly develop her' 
three paragraph argument for URAP 24(k) fees, and because appellants fully 
responded to and met the argument she did make, there should be no award 
of attorney fees under URAP 24(k) without a hearing providing due process. 
CONCLUSION 
The award of attorney fees under/dRXP 24(k) should be removed. 
DATED THIS 19th DAY OF DECEMBER, 200^] / 
ROBER^4lEN^rCOPIER 
AttoaieyibpB^endants 
William Lowe and Augusta Rose 
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DANIEL F. VAN WOERKOM 
SANDRA K. WEEKS 
HALA L. AFU 
VAN WOERKOM & WEEKS, LC 
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